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DNA, SCIENCE AND THE LAW:
TWO CHEERS FOR THE
CEILING PRINCIPLE
Richard Lempert*

I. WHOSE VALVES?
The late, great Yankee baseball manager, Casey Stengel, is reported to
have once dreamed that he died and went to heaven, where he was asked by
the Lord to organize a baseball team. Casey looked around at Babe Ruth, Ty
Cobb, Christy Mathewson-all the great players-and was thrilled. But who
would they play? The question was quickly answered, for no sooner was the
team assembled and the players in shape when the phone rang. It was Satan,
challenging Heaven's minions to a game. "But you don't understand," said
Casey. "You don't have a chance. I've got all the players." "No, you don't
understand," said Satan, "I've got all the umpires."
So-too often-seems the relationship between law and science. Science
has the players-reliable facts and ways of determining reality. But law has
the umpires-it sets the rules, and regulates the game. Law's rules can confuse,
contradict or render irrelevant what sound science has to say. Moreover, law
can (though it does not always) confound science in these ways without making
bad law or promoting injustice. This is possible because while law's goal of
*Richard Lempert is Francis A. Allen Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School, and Professor of Sociology and Acting Chair of the Department of Scoiology at the
University of Michigan. He was a member of the National Research Council's Committee on
DNA Technology in Forensic Science. A version of this Article was presented at the Second
International Conference on Forensic Statistics, Arizona State University College of Law, Tempe
Arizona, March 1993. Professor Lempert would like to thank Michael Finkelstein, David Kaye,
Jonathan Koehler, Jim Krier, Rick Pildes and Bruce Weir for reading and commenting on an
earlier draft of this Article.
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justice is ordinarily congruent with science's goal of truth, the two are not the
same. Law, for example, can properly prefer a system in which none of ten
innocent defendants and 70 of 100 guilty defendants are convicted to a system
in which everyone is convicted even though the latter system has twenty fewer
errors.

Occasionally scientists are more than players in law's game. Law may
invite scientists to act as umpires, to state rules for incorporating science
into law. When this happens interesting questions arise. Should scientists in
specifying what good scientific practice entails be influenced by legal values,
such as the law's special abhorrence of convicting the innocent, or should they
limit themselves to specifying how to get closest to scientific truth? And how

should science's recommendations to law be judged? Should they be judged
by the scientific tenability of each separate recommendation, or should the test
be how the recommendations are likely to affect justice over the run of cases?1
The difficulty of these questions is compounded by the fact that law would
not need scientists to play an umpire-like role, if the requisites of good science

were clear in the first instance. Thus, these legal value questions may be
inextricably though not always visibly mixed with legitimate disputes about

what constitutes good science. This I believe has happened in the scientific
debate surrounding the * Veiling principle" recommendation of the National
Research Council's Committee on DNA Testing in Forensic Science.2 Critics
and defenders have disputed the requisites of good science narrowly defined,
rather than asking what constitutes both justice and good science in a larger
legal framework.

II. THE CEILING PRINCIPLE
No portion of the NRC report on DNA evidence has been as controversial
or as criticized as the recommendation that the statistical implications of DNA
matches be estimated in accordance with what the Committee that drafted the
report calls the * Veiling principle" (and a variant on it to be used while the

data needed to implement the ceiling principle are collected). The ceiling
principle is an intentionally conservative way of estimating the frequency with
which individuals who share particular alleles appear in the general population.

It establishes frequencies for each allele by taking random samples of 100
individuals from each of 15 to 20 populations and using the largest frequency
with which the allele is found in any of these populations or 5%, whichever

1. Valid information may contribute to invalid verdicts. For example, testimony that cor?
rectly places an innocent person near a murder scene may result in a mistaken conviction. Better
science need not lead to better verdicts if poorer science offsets errors that would otherwise remain

uncorrected.

2. National Research Council Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Sci?
ence, DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992).
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is larger, as an estimate of the allele's frequency in the population of interest.
These frequencies are then multiplied to yield an estimate of the likelihood that

a randomly selected person would exhibit the same allelic configuration as that
which characterizes samples of DNA associated with the defendant and with

some crime.

I served on the Committee that produced this report and joined the other

Committee members in subscribing to the ceiling principle, although I was
considerably more enthusiastic about this approach when it was first suggested
than when I ultimately signed off on it.3 The reason my enthusiasm diminished
is that between the time the principle was suggested and the date the Committee
finally signed off on it, a number of studies had appeared which suggested
that the kinds of convenience samples used to establish DNA frequencies for
forensic purposes were considerably more robust to the threat of population
substructure than one might have supposed when the Committee began its
work.4 My enthusiasm dipped still more when I realized, some months after
the Committee's report had been published, that in most forensic situations the

problem the ceiling principle was designed to resolve?the possibility that
forensic data bases would by ignoring population substructure substantially

underestimate relevant allele frequencies?hardly ever exists because the
proper reference population for estimating allele frequencies is typically a
mixed population fairly represented by the data bases now in use.5 Yet as I
3. There is a general problem here that may affect the products of other specially appointed
committees charged with resolving questions in rapidly developing areas of scientific inquiry ,
Budget considerations allow most committees to meet on only a few occasions, and time deadlines
mean that work on committee reports must begin early in the investigatory process. Thus, a
committee's most thorough deliberations and commitments to an outcome may occur before
research that merits additional deliberations has appeared in the scientific literature. Ultimately,
a committee's members must commit themselves to a report, but even after this point new develop?
ments may make commitments appear premature. While committees like the NRC DNA committee
can and do make changes up to the point where a draft goes to the printer, late changes can only
be vetoed by committee members; they ordinarily cannot be exposed to the testing of thorough
deliberations that are possible early in the process. Moreover, committee members may be reluc?
tant to try to change collective understandings that have resulted from a thorough thrashing out
of issues not too long before. The NRC has recently been encouraging its members to communicate
through e-mail. Perhaps this innovation will help the committees created by that organization to
better deal with the problems that fast moving science poses.
4. B. Budowle et al., Fixed-Bin Analysis for Statistical Evaluation of Continuous Distribu?
tions of Allele Data from VNTR Loci, for Use in Forensic Comparisons, 48 Am. J. Hum. Genet.

841 (1991); R. Chakraborty, Statistical Interpretation of DNA Typing Data, 49 Am. J. Hum.
Genet. 895 (1991); R. Chakraborty & K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work,
254 Science 1735 (1991); B. Devlin et al., No Excess of Homozygosity at Loci Used for DNA
Fingerprinting, 249 Science 1416 (1990); I.W. Evett & P. Gill, A Discussion of the Robustness
of Methods of Assessing the Evidential Value of DNA Single Locus Profiles in Crime Investigations,

12 Electrophoresis 226 (1991); I.W. Evett & R. Pinchin, DNA Single-Locus Profiles: Tests for

Robustness of Statistical Procedures Within the Context of Forensic Science, 104 Int'l J.L. Med.

267 (1991).

5. Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 4; I.W. Evett & B.S. Weir, Flawed Reasoning in Court,
4 Chance 19(1991); R. Lempert, The Suspect Population and DNA Identification, 34Jurimetrics
J. 1 (1993); J.R. Wooley, A Response to Lander: The Courtroom Perspective, 49 Am. J. Hum.

Genet. 892 (1991).
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reflect on the use of DNA evidence in court, I am prepared to give two cheers
for the ceiling principle and to argue with about the same level of confidence
that I endorsed the principle in the first place, that it is preferable to the status

quo ante, even if we can do better.

III. THE MISSING THIRD CHEER
While I am prepared to give two cheers, I cannot give the full three
for, as a scientific matter, there is much that appears wrong with the ceiling
principle. Some of these problems do not inhere in the ceiling principle, but
in the details of the Committee's conception. Devlin, Risch and Roeder for
example, claim that the 100 person samples from which ceiling frequencies
are to be determined are so small that the impact of sampling error on maximum
allele frequency estimates may be "tremendous,"6 and Weir has argued that
if the ceiling principle is to be used, maximum frequencies in different data
bases should not be multiplied but rather one should use the maximum over
populations of products of allele frequencies.7 These, however, are not telling
criticisms even if they are accepted, for the construction of ceiling frequencies
and estimates based on them could be altered to satisfy them.
It is also the case that although the ceiling principle was designed to yield
results so conservative that no person would be disadvantaged by calculations

based on it, thisf need not be the case. Cohen has constructed an example
which illustrates that allelic association within populations sampled means that
applying the product rule to ceiling estimates can underestimate the frequency
with which a particular combination of alleles can occur,8 and it is obvious that
there may be ethnic groups in which certain alleles are more common than

they are in the groups sampled. These criticisms too, however, do not seem
fundamental. Cohen's argument is formally correct, but there is little reason
to think that the possibility he points to will be forensically significant. As for
the problem posed by missed ethnic groups, it is likely to be most important
in the case of rare alleles, and the Committee dealt with this by establishing
the conservative rule that in no case will a ceiling frequency be estimated at

less than .05. This solution has an uncomfortable ad hoc quality to it, for
science does not specify .05 as opposed to .04 or .06 as a sensible figure to
account for unsampled populations, and it does not deal with the possibility
that an allele which has a maximum frequency of 6% in some sampled popula?

tion might characterize 24% of some unsampled population. However, if

6. B. Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA Fingerprinting: A Critique of the NRC's

Report, 259 Science 748, 837 (1993).
7. B.S. Weir, Population Genetics in the Forensic DNA Debate, 89 Proc. Nat'l Ac ad.

Sei. USA 11654 (1992).

8. J.E. Cohen, The Ceiling Principle is Not Always Conservative in Assigning Genotype
Frequencies for Forensic DNA Testing, 51 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 1165 (1992).
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unfairness to defendants is the concern, this criticism, as we shall see, applies
only in special circumstances, and where it does the ceiling principle calculated
according to the Committee's recommendations has the most to commend it
in comparison with current methods.9

While criticisms of the ceiling principle like the above may be useful,
they do not go to the heart of the matter. The fundamental criticism of the
ceiling principle is that it does not seem to provide a good scientific estimate
of the probability that DNA matching evidence DNA would be found if the
DNA of some person selected at random were analyzed. Instead it seems likely
to provide estimates of this probability that are many orders of magnitude more
conservative than the true probability that a randomly selected individual would

have matching DNA. Indeed, I would guess that even the ceiling principle's
advocates if allowed to bet on the probability that the DNA of a randomly
selected person would match evidence DNA would bet on a probability closer
by several orders of magnitude to that indicated by the product rule using
existing data base frequencies than to the number which the product rule
applied to ceiling principle frequencies generates.10 Granted, procedures for
calculating the probability of DNA matches should be conservative so as not
to unduly incriminate suspects, but moderate degrees of conservatism are
arguably built into procedures like those of the FBI lab by decisions regarding
such matters as bin sizes and the statistical treatment of apparently homozygotic
alleles. Numbers of reputable scientists would echo Morton's judgment that
the ceiling principle is "absurdly conservative."11
More importantly, although the issue has been disputed,12 most empirical
9. The chances are that any disadvantage a defendant would suffer in this situation would
be counterbalanced by the committee's suggestion that ceiling frequencies be taken as the product
of maximum allele frequencies among populations rather than, as Weir, supra note 7, would have
it, the maximum over populations of products of allele frequencies. This is because it is almost
certain that at some alleles the maximum frequencies taken from the sampled ethnic groups will
overestimate allele frequencies in the defendant's ethnic groups and so any disadvantage a defen?
dant may suffer from a maximum that underestimates relevant allele frequencies will be canceled
out in the multiplication process.
10. The judgment is based on the overwhelming bulk of the research done to date, but there
is one prominent study which finds that probabilities of matching DNA profiles between two
randomly selected individuals as calculated by the interim ceiling principle are more adequate in
a situation of substantial population substructure than probabilities estimated by applying the
product rule using a mixed Caucasian database. D. Krane et al., Genetic Differences at Four DNA

Typing Loci in Finnish, Italian and Mixed Caucasian Populations, 89 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci.

USA 10583 (1992). Should additional research be consistent with the Krane et al. findings, a third
cheer for the ceiling principle might be warranted. At the moment, however, this seems unlikely,
for Devlin and his coauthors, citing unpublished work by Budowle, appear to have shown that
the Krane et al. findings result from a statistical artifact associated with the analysis of the Krane

et al. database. B. Devlin, NRC Report on DNA Typing, 260 Science 1057 (1993) (letter).
11. N.E. Morton, Genetic Structure of Forensic Populations, 89 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci.

USA 2556 (1992).

12. R.C. Lewontin & D.L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 Science
1745 (1991); J.E. Cohen, DNA Fingerprinting for Forensic Identification: Potential Effects on
Data Interpretation of Subpopulation Heterogeneity and Band Number Variability, 46 Am. J.

Hum. Genet. 358 (1990)
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studies fail to find any forensically significant departures from Hardy
Weinberg or linkage equilibria within general populations.13 Berry, Evett and
Pinchin show that even when a highly stratified population is created by com?
bining the profiles that resulted from two analyses of 218 Caucasian heterozy?
gotes and 222 Afro-Caribbean heterozygotes with every fragment length in the
Caucasian file doubled there were few false matches (0.5%) when all persons
within one half sample were compared using the other half sample as a simu?
lated population data base.14 There is even research that indicates that if a
population data base established for one race is used to evaluate random match
probabilities for persons of another race, underestimates are likely to be practi?
cally inconsequential because false matches will be rare and estimates based on
same race reference populations are themselves likely to be of overwhelming

magnitude.15
These studies do not, however, obviate the possibility that allele distribu?
tions within population reference samples, even if stratified by black, Cauca?
sian or Hispanic ethnicity, will underestimate allele frequencies among a defen?
dant's coethnics more narrowly defined, and it is this possibility against which
the ceiling principle most effectively guards. However, in most forensic situa?
tions there is no need to guard against this possibility because, as has been
recently recognized, the defendant's ethnicity says nothing about the ethnic
composition of the sample that should be used to evaluate the probability that
someone other than the defendant left the evidence DNA.16 Rather than mirror
the defendant's ethnicity, this sample should mirror the ethnicities of the group

of plausible alternative suspects, or what I have called the "suspect popula?
tion."17 Sometimes this group of suspects will be of mixed ethnic and racial
backgrounds and on other occasions, as when a victim has identified the race
of her attacker, it will be a mixed ethnic sample of persons who share the same
socially defined racial heritage.

While cases have occasionally arisen in which the suspect population is
largely composed of members of some inbred ethnic group, such cases are so
rare that they are unlikely to justify the expense of gathering the data needed

13. J. Brookfield, The Effect of Population Subdivision on Estimates of the Likelihood Ratio

in Criminal Cases Using Single-Locus DNA Probes, 69 Heredity 97 (1992); Chakraborty &

Kidd, supra note 4; Devlin et al., supra note 4; Evett & Gill, supra note 4; Evett & Pinchin, supra
note 4; Morton, supra note 11; B.S. Weir, Independence of VNTR Alleles Defined as Fixed Bins,

130 Genetics 873 (1992); B.S. Weir, Independence of VNTR Alleles Defined as Floating Bins,

51 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 992 (1992).

14. D. A. Berry et al., Statistical Inference in Crime Investigations Using Deoxyribonucleic

Acid Profiling, 41 Applied Stat. 499 (1992).

15. I.W. Evett, DNA Statistics: Putting the Problems Into Perspective, 33 Jurimetrics J.

139 (1992).

16. Devlin et al., supra note 6; Lempert, supra note 5; Evett & Weir, supra note 5; Wooley,

supra note 5.
17. Lempert, supra note 5.
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to apply the ceiling principle. Thus, the concern the ceiling principle most
directly addresses, the possibility that the frequency of a defendant's alleles
in the defendant's ethnic group narrowly defined is substantially higher than
it is in a general population data base, is most often irrelevant. Regardless of

the defendant's ethnicity, a general population data base, refined only by
information which specifies the ethnicity of those in the suspect population,
will be appropriate to evaluate the probability that someone other than the
defendant left the evidence DNA. Recognizing this as true, how can anyone
give even one cheer for the ceiling principle?

IV. REASONS FOR CHEERING
The ceiling principle blends scientific and value considerations; indeed
the blend of the two is in large measure what makes the ceiling principle
vulnerable to scientific criticism. It is also what makes it an arguably more
attractive forensic approach than current product rule procedures. The core
value which motivated the NRC Committee's recommendation was its sense
that the calculation of random match probabilities should be conservative in
the sense that any errors in the random match probability should overestimate
rather than underestimate the probability that someone other than the defendant
left the evidence DNA.19 This reflects the law's sense, reflected in the presump?

tion of innocence and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal
convictions, that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an innocent

one. There is no scientific basis for this value, but it is generally accepted
among scientists concerned with the DNA identification; the FBI, for example,

justifies its fixed bin system in part by the claimed conservativeness of its
binning procedures. Indeed, the NRC Committee's central task was arguably
to determine what scientifically sound procedures best implemented this legal
value. This task is different from the task of determining how to secure the
most probable point estimate of the likelihood that some random person left
evidence DNA, and the NRC Committee cannot be criticized for suggesting
a method that does not yield a' 'most probable'' estimate. Science alone cannot
provide a yardstick with which to measure the Committee's recommendations.

The Committee may, however, be criticized for overvaluing conserva

18. A better solution is for the prosecution in such cases to content itself with simply pointing
out the likelihood of a match and the fact that matches across the tested loci are ordinarily rare
events. As suggested by the experience of Minnesota, which for its own idiosyncratic reasons
once did not allow statistical weights to be put on DNA evidence, DNA matches can help secure
convictions even when no statistical weights are attached to them.
19. Note that this probability estimate is not given directly by the random match probability
to which DNA experts testify. Rather, it is a function of the random match probability, taken in
conjunction with information about the size of the suspect population and other evidence in the
case. J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence, 34 Jurimetrics

J. 21 (1993).
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tism. While mistaken convictions should be regarded as more abhorrent than
mistaken acquittals, in the kinds of cases in which DNA evidence figures, the

costs of letting guilty people go can be horrendous. Had Ted Bundy, for
example, been convicted after his first arrest, a number of murdered women

would be alive today. Many of the criticisms of the ceiling principle stem
from the sense that it yields estimates that are lower by numbers of orders of
magnitude than well-justified random match probabilities that conservative
binning procedures and a proper understanding of the suspect population gen?

erate.

If what was most important forensically was presenting juries with random
match probabilities that were close to but somewhat more conservative than
true random match probabilities, I would favor procedures like the FBI's to

the ceiling principle. However, the statistic that should influence a jury's
determination of guilt or innocence is not the likelihood that a random member

of the suspect population might have DNA matching the evidence DNA but
rather the likelihood that the jury would be told that the suspect's DNA matched
the evidence DNA if the evidence DNA did not come from the defendant. This
probability is lower, often by many orders of magnitude, than the random

match probabilities which current product rule procedures are designed to
yield. There are two reasons for this. The first is that laboratory error can lead
to false positive results, and the second is that the donor of the evidence DNA

might not be a random member of the population but could instead be a
close relative of the defendant. Neither of these possibilities seems adequately

accounted for by the way in which DNA evidence is routinely presented.
Good science as well as legal values demand that these possibilities should be

considered when juries are presented with DNA evidence.
It is now recognized that the probative value of a DNA match is limited
by the likelihood that a false positive would be reported.20 If, for example,
there is a one in a hundred chance that a laboratory or handling error has led
to a false positive report in a particular case, the jury is likely to overweigh
the implications of the match if in addition they learn that (assuming test
accuracy) there is a one in a billion chance that some random person left the
sample. One cannot assume test accuracy; one can only assume a 99% chance
of accuracy. While the point has yet to be explored empirically, the intuition
that the jury will weight the incriminatory probability somewhere between one
in a hundred and one in a billion if they are given the latter figure, is a powerful

one. Indeed, if the jurors will not overweight the evidence, the one in a billion

figure will have no effect on their deliberations, and there is no reason to
present it. The efforts of prosecutors and the scientists that testify for them
to introduce random match probabilities that are dwarfed by false positive
20. P.J. Hagerman, DNA Typing in the Forensic Arena, 47 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 876
(1990) (letter); Koehler, supra note 19; R. Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA As Criminal
Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 303 (1991).
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probabilities is an effort to place scientifically unjustified weight on the finding

of a DNA match.

The false positive problem is not handled well in courts today, and there
is little reason to believe it will be. In several cases scientists presenting DNA

evidence have stated that it is impossible to have false positives in DNA
testing,21 and courts have endorsed these views. Judicial endorsement is not
surprising for intuitively it is hard to imagine analytic mishaps that would cause
all DNA bands tested to coincidentally align; police or prosecutorial efforts to
dishonestly strengthen cases by doctoring DNA samples seem beyond the pale,
and sample switching or contamination which might lead to false positives

seems so easily avoidable with minimal care as not to be a problem. Yet in
the few blind proficiency tests done to date, false positives have occurred at
a rate that appears somewhat in excess of one percent,22 and false positives in
other kinds of forensic tests are common.23
There is also little prospect for accurately identifying false positive proba?
bilities since these probabilities are specific to particular cases, depending on

the circumstances in which DNA specimens are left and collected and the
honesty and abilities of all individuals involved in the collection and analytic
processes. False positive estimates based on proficiency testing are averages

over many types of cases and will over or understate the probabilities in
particular cases. Moreover, while false positive rates in blind proficiency tests
may provide the best possible estimate of laboratory error rates, they may be
difficult to establish. If false positives are indeed rare in DNA testing for the
reasons courts intuit, labs may not undergo enough blind proficiency tests to
reveal errors even if false positive probabilities are many orders of magnitudes
higher than the random match frequencies the labs report.
Although the legal system has not dealt well with the problem of false
positives, it appears from the reported cases that defense counsel at least raise
the possibility of error in cross-examining prosecution experts. The possibility
that a relative may have left evidence DNA does not seem to receive even this

21. For examples, see Koehler, supra note 19. Indeed, in conversing with a forensic scientist
at a conference, I was told that a false positive match was impossible. Pursuing the conversation,
it was clear that this scientist meant something different from a "false positive" than I did. She
did not mean that finding a match meant that a suspect's DNA matched evidence DNA. She simply
meant that DNA in the suspect and evidence lanes of an autorad would not match unless it was
identical. If, for example, a laboratory mix-up meant that both lanes contained evidence DNA,
she would not consider incorrect testimony that a defendant's DNA matched evidence DNA to
be a false positive error. Even as she defined false positives, however, they are not impossible
unless the possibility the scientist will mistakenly call a non-match a match is also considered to

be something other than a false positive report. W.C. Thompson & S. Ford, The Meaning of a
Match: Sources of Ambiguity in the Interpretation of DNA Prints, in Forensic DNA Technology

(M. Farley & J. Harrington eds., 1990).
22. Koehler, supra note 19; Lempert, supra note 20; U.S. Congress, Office of Technol?

ogy Assessment, Genetic Witness: Forensic Uses of DNA Tests (1990) [OTA Report].

23. R.N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 109
(1991); OTA Report, supra note 22.
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much attention. Yet in many cases relatives will be in the suspect population
since people often live close to their relatives, and features which lead victims
to pick out particular suspects as their assailants are likely to be shared by one
or more of the suspect's close relations.25 The implications of relatives in the

suspect population can be substantial. Several researchers have pointed out
that the probability that one brother's DNA will match another's DNA across
four loci can be greater by several orders of magnitude than the probability
that an unrelated individual's DNA would match,26 and the suspect population
may include a number of brothers as well as many uncles, cousins and other
more distant relatives. In this connection a rape-incest case involving paternity
testing is instructive. In Commonwealth v. Breadmore,21 a young woman ac?

cused both her grandfather and his son, the woman's uncle, of having had
intercourse with her. Four probes failed to distinguish the suspects as did a
cocktail of several probes mixed together, but a fifth probe excluded the uncle.
Had the young woman kept secret her relations with her grandfather, and had
no one else suspected his involvement, the state's DNA expert probably would
have been willing to testify on the basis of four probes that the uncle had almost

certainly fathered the baby.

For these reasons I conclude that even though the critics are probably
correct in their claim that ceiling principle estimates of the probability that a
24. Lempert, supra note 20, and the NRC Report note this possibility; it is dealt with at
length only by I.W. Evett, Evaluating DNA Profiles in a Case Where the Defense Is "It Was My

Brother", 32 j. Forensic. Sci. Soc'y 5 (1992). B.S. Weir and W.G. Hill treat the issue briefly
and present likelihood ratios that conflict with the NRC's analysis. Population Genetics of DNA
Profiles (unpublished manuscript 1993).
25. J. Brookfield suggests that relatedness is unlikely to pose problems. He argues that
since there are far more relatives in a population than non-relatives, the prior probability of
non-relatedness, given innocence, will usually be one. (In other words, since there are so few
relatives and so many non-relatives in the population, if the defendant is innocent, the probability
that a non-relative rather than a relative will be guilty is almost 1. Thus, the probability that a
relative shares the same DNA allele configuration as the defendant may be substantially discounted

because, if the defendant did not leave the evidence DNA, it is overwhelmingly likely to have
been left by someone unrelated to the defendant.) J. Brookfield, Discussion of Berry et al., supra
note 14, at 526. Brookfield's argument is flawed because he ignores the heightened probability
that those factors that made the defendant a suspect will make suspects of his relatives with a much
higher probability than they will make suspects of the general population. Thus, in the extreme
case of an identical twin, if the defendant was arrested on the basis of numerous unimpeachable
eyewitness identifications, and his DNA matches the evidence DNA, and he is innocent, then his
twin is almost certainly guilty. Figuring likelihood ratios on the supposition that a relative left the
evidence DNA in this situation is not an approach that * 'reaches absurdity'' as Brookfield suggests
but rather correctly informs the jury that the DNA evidence cannot help them choose between two
people, one of whom is almost certainly guilty and the other of whom is innocent. In the more
ordinary case where arrest is based on vaguer descriptions, neighborhood residence and, perhaps,
acquaintance with the victim, relatives may still be far more likely to be guilty if the suspect is
innocent than non-related members of the suspect population, perhaps by orders of magnitude that
more than make up for their small numbers. Thus, while Brookfield's approach may justify some
discounting of the "it was my brother probability" the justified discounting will often not be
nearly so great as to justify ignoring the possibility.

26. See supra note 24.
27. 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d 311 (1992).
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random man left evidence DNA are far more conservative than is scientifically
justified, even allowing for the desirability of conservative estimates, the fig?
ures yielded by the ceiling principle are likely to mislead juries less about the

weight that should be accorded DNA matches than the results yielded by
current product rule procedures. In other words the error and relative problems
make the ceiling principle probabilities closer to the best scientific estimate
that a DNA match would be reported if the defendant did not leave the evidence
DNA than the probabilities generated by the procedures that such leading and
thoughtful forensic scientists as Weir and Evett defend.
This defense of the ceiling principle may strike scientists as a bit bizarre,
and I admit there is something bizarre about it.28 The ceiling principle was
never designed to address the problems posed by false positives or by relatives
in the suspect population, and it is only by coincidence that it might come close
to estimating the true implications of these possibilities, a coincidence that will
seldom occur. It's virtue lies simply in the fact that it yields very conservative
probabilities that a match would be reported. These probabilities are less likely
to substantially overweight the scientifically justifiable probative value of a
reported DNA match than are the extremely low probabilities commonly gener?
ated by the product rule and traditional match binning. Perhaps even more
bizarrely from a pure science standpoint, the virtues I ascribe to the ceiling
principle can be lost if, as the NRC Committee suggests, prosecutors add to
the evidentiary weight of matches by testing more alleles or if such scientifically

sound suggestions as Weir's suggestion to use the maximum over populations
of the products of allele frequencies are adopted.29 The ceiling principle is

clearly a "second best" solution, but it is a second best world we live in.
Lawyers too find arguments that openly appeal to second best principles
strange. But the legal mind that makes peninsulas into islands or calls a boat
anchored in New York harbor British soil has coped with stranger situations.
As Justice Jackson wrote of an arguably irrational rule regarding character

evidence,

[M]uch of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and
compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by
a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. But somehow it has proved
a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary con?
trols in the hands of a wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen

stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its
present balance between adversarial interests than to establish a rational

edifice.30

28. I should note that this was not my rationale for subscribing to the ceiling principle as
a member of the NRC Committee. When it was proposed I thought it was a conservative but
scientifically sound way of practically resolving a debate over the prevalence of population sub?
structure that population geneticists could not resolve for the Committee or the courts.

29. Weir, supra note 7.
30. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).

FALL 1993 51

Lempert
Of course, it is somewhat different when a new misshapen stone is intro?

duced to help make a grotesque structure. I will come back to this and discuss
the possibility of a first best solution after briefly canvassing several other
reasons to cheer for the ceiling principle.

V. OTHER VALUES OF THE CEILING PRINCIPLE
From a forensic standpoint there are additional reasons to approve of the
ceiling principle, although I must note at the outset that several of these reasons

depend on plausible but untested empirical assumptions. First, the ceiling
principle makes the issue of the defendant's ethnicity irrelevant. The jury may
be told that regardless of the defendant's ethnicity and the ethnicity of plausible
suspects, the chance that a random person left the evidence DNA is almost
certainly no higher and probably much lower than the ceiling figure. In remov?
ing ethnicity from the picture, a potential source of jury confusion is eliminated
and one need not worry about the possibility that the concept of the suspect
population, which ordinarily makes ethnicity irrelevant, seems intuitively less
plausible than the idea that the frequency of a defendant's alleles should be
measured by the extent to which coethnics share those alleles.

Second, and very important, the ceiling principle can be expected to
generate probabilities sufficient to convict guilty defendants. Since guilty de?
fendants are usually implicated by non DNA evidence (e.g., eyewitness identi?
fications) consistent with the DNA identification, extreme probabilities should
not be needed to secure convictions.31 Thus testimony that there is a one in a

billion chance that a randomly selected person has DNA that would match the
evidence DNA, while impressive, is unlikely to lead to convictions that would
not result if a more modest probability like one in a ten thousand were given.
Third, the more modest ceiling principle probabilities are less likely than
normal product rule probabilities to overwhelm the other evidence in the case.
Extraordinarily high probabilities may be essential to secure convictions where
the defense's case appears stronger than the prosecution's case apart from the

DNA evidence. These are, however, the cases in which there is the greatest
reason to suspect laboratory error, the possibility of a relative's involvement,
or a rare coincidence. In the more common case, where both the DNA evidence
and other evidence favors conviction, the ceiling principle's conservative prob?
abilities are likely to leave both the jurors and the defendant feeling that the
verdict reflects the jurors' serious consideration of all the facts rather than the

simple endorsement of an expert's conclusion that was bolstered by over

31. In some cases appellate courts have ruled that DNA evidence and probabilities associated
with that evidence should not have been admitted at trial, but have properly refused to reverse
guilty verdicts holding that the evidence apart from the DNA evidence was so overwhelming as
to guarantee a conviction. See, e.g., People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 10 Cal. Rptr. 731

(1992).
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whelming numbers which dwarfed all other incriminating evidence. So long
as criminal convictions are a human process entrusted to ordinary citizens,
numbers which make convictions likely without obscuring other evidence that

juries are well equipped to evaluate are a good thing.
Fourth, the ceiling principle responds adequately to those rare cases in
which reliance on a general population data base is most likely to yield mis?

leading results; namely cases in which the suspect population is composed
largely of members of an inbred ethnic group. If ceiling frequencies were not
available, the most defensible scientific procedure would be to simply state
the fact of a match without attaching probabilities. This would unnecessarily
sacrifice incriminating weight.
Fifth, it is unlikely that different laboratories are individually going to
invest in the numerous ethnic group analyses needed to generate ceiling princi?
ples. Thus, to apply the ceiling rule, different laboratories will have to standard?
ize their procedures and meet performance standards similar to those high
standards that should be used to identify ceiling frequencies in the first instance.
This is a strange route to this end, but the end is desirable however it is reached.

In short, whatever its scientific flaws, the ceiling principle is the viable
compromise for forensic work that it was intended to be. Compared to the
traditional product rule, the probabilities it generates are likely to be farther
from the true probability it purports to set a ceiling on?namely the probability
that, assuming no error, a randomly selected member of the suspect population
has DNA like the evidence DNA. But it is likely to be closer to the probability
that is more relevant to the jury's task?namely the likelihood that a match
would be reported if some member of the suspect population other than the
defendant in fact left the evidence DNA. Thus, it might be wiser if less scientific

energy were devoted to challenging the ceiling principle and more to collecting
and analyzing the data which would allow ceiling frequencies to be established.

VI. A FIRST BEST SOLUTION
Yet even if I am correct and the ceiling principle is likely to generate
probabilities that are closer than current product rule probabilities to the weight

that good science (which must acknowledge the possibility of laboratory error
or brothers doing it) would place on DNA matches, it does not mean that we
should give up the search for solutions that would obviate the need for the
ceiling principle and the scientific compromises it entails. A better solution is,
however, possible only if the state in presenting DNA evidence is willing to
acknowledge limits on the probative value of reported DNA matches. These
are limits that the state now leaves to defendants to raise on cross-examination
as if only self-interested defendants could believe that the extreme probabilities
generated by product rule calculations do not tell the whole scientific story.
Thus, as a first step toward a better solution, the state should acknowledge the
possibility of laboratory error in its case-in-chief and tell the jury that the false
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positive probability limits the incriminatory weight of a DNA match. Based
on proficiency testing done to date these limits are substantial for an estimated
false positive rate of 2% appears to be as small as can be currently justified.
However, if DNA evidence is separated and sent independently to two labora?
tories much lower false positive probabilities, say on the order of 1/2000, will
be justified since most sources of false positive error should be independent

across laboratories.32

The false positive rate is arguably all a jury should be informed of unless
the random match probability is greater than or of the same order of magnitude

as the likelihood of a false positive. To tell the jury that there is a two percent
chance that a reported match falsely implicates the defendant and a one in 10
billion chance that a randomly selected person would match the evidence DNA
that the defendant's DNA purportedly matches is to invite the jury to see the
improbability of a reported match if the defendant were innocent as somewhere
between the two figures.
Yet presenting the random match probability has some virtues. In particu?
lar, it may dampen the likelihood that jurors will make what Thompson and
Schuman have called the ' 'defense attorney's fallacy.' '33 This is a tendency for

jurors to regard evidence that is unlikely if a defendant is innocent as having
almost no incriminatory value if many others might share the same characteris?

tic. In our example, a juror might reason that there are 100,000 potential
suspects, that a two percent false positive rate means that the defendant is one

of 2000 people whose DNA would have been reported to match the evidence
DNA had it been tested, and that being part of a group so large has virtually
no incriminatory value. In fact, in the context of the other evidence in a case,
such evidence may be quite probative of guilt. Knowing that a reported match
is highly incriminatory, if valid, may encourage jurors to weight the evidence
in accordance with its likely validity, as they ordinarily should.34 Information,
32. Since certain error sources like the intentional contamination of evidence and suspect
DNA or the possibility that laboratories will interpret ambiguities to please clients may affect labs
working independently, the probability of error when two labs reach the same result is somewhat
less than the square of the probability that a single lab will err. Two prosecutors have suggested
that defendants be responsible for securing an independent DNA test. J. Wooley & R.P. Harmon,

The Forensic DNA Brouhaha: Science or Debate? 51 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 1164 (1992) (letter).
This suggestion has much to commend it?assuming that the state supplies defendants with the
money needed to order tests. Laboratories would not associate their clients with one side or the
other, and some defendants who knew they were guilty would save the state money by not
requesting a test. Thus, if a defendant were able to order a second test and refused, the state should

be able to present error probabilities as if the DNA had been twice tested. A shortcoming of
multiple testing is that false negatives are more likely than false positives; thus, with multiple
testing, results might be inconsistent and this might increase the chances that a jury would under?

weight DNA evidence and acquit a guilty defendant.
33. W.C. Thompson & E.L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal

Trials, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 167 (1987).

34. This is another "second best" argument since the jurors' intuition that other potential
suspects would be as vulnerable as the defendant to false positive results is largely correct.
Empirical research should be done to determine the implications of presenting both false positive
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about the random match probability may also, in some circumstances, be
necessary so that jurors do not overweight DNA matches, particularly if inde?
pendent tests have been run, lowering the false positive probability substan?
tially. Even when random match probabilities are quite small, if there is little
other incriminatory evidence and many potential suspects, true matches may
do little more than identify the defendant as one of a small number of people
who might have committed the crime.35 When random match probabilities are

large as compared to false positive rates, they are, of course, necessary to
properly weigh the evidence.
If random match probabilities are to be presented there must first be a
careful definition of the suspect population, which will make clear the irrele?
vance of the defendant's ethnicity in most cases as well as the special situations

in which allele frequencies drawn from general population data bases may
unfairly disadvantage a defendant. Also, the implications of relatives in the
suspect population must be considered. The defendant, as a precondition to
considering these implications should be required to identify relatives who
belong to the suspect population. The prosecution then could present the jury
with the probability that a random man might have left the evidence DNA and
the probability that one of the defendant's identified relatives might have left
it. If the latter probability was high, the state could explain why particular
relatives were not considered likely suspects.
If DNA evidence were presented in accordance with these strictures, the
extremely low probabilities that dazzle juries would disappear and an opposite
danger could emerge. Juries might underweight the incriminatory value of

DNA matches, and guilty defendants might be freed. This danger could be
alleviated by a change in the way DNA statistics are presented. Following the
suggestions of Evett,36 Berry,37 Kaye38 and others the statistical implications
and random match probabilities to find if outcomes are in fact more normative than when false

positive rates alone are presented. Research by Thompson and Schumann, supra note 33, with
other data suggests that the text's second best argument is not implausible. If, however, the
Bayesian strategy I argue for below is used, there should be no need to present random match
probabilities for this reason.
35. Koehler, supra note 19, for example, points out that if there is a random match probability

of only one in 705 million and 1,000,000 potential sources of the evidence DNA, there is a 14%
chance that at least one of the other potential sources had matching DNA. Where there is no
incriminatory evidence apart from the statistical evidence, the defense attorney's argument regard?
ing others who might have left the evidence is no longer fallacious. While this situation may appear
hypothetical, it will not be once DNA data bases come on line and potential offenders are identified

through searching data bases.
36. I.W. Evett, DNA Statistics: Putting the Problems Into Perspective, 156 Justice of

the Peace 583 (1992); I.W. Evett et al., Bayesian Analysis of Single Locus DNA Profiles, in
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Human Identification 1989 77 (1990);
I.W. Evett et al., An Efficient Statistical Procedure for Interpreting DNA Single Locus Profiling

Data in Crime Cases, 32 J. Forensic Sci. Soc'y 307 (1992).

37. D.A. Berry, Inferences Using DNA Profiling in Forensic Identification and Paternity

Cases, 6 Stat. Sci. 175 (1991).

38. D.H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts, Harv.
J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 1993).
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of DNA evidence should be presented as likelihood ratios.39 The implications
of a likelihood ratio for guilt, however, are different for different prior proba?
bilities of guilt, that is, for different estimates of the odds that would have been
placed on a defendant's guilt had the information captured in the likelihood
ratio not been presented. This poses difficulties for jurors who on their own
are unlikely to be able to combine a likelihood ratio with unspecified prior
probabilities of guilt even if they understand what is going on. However, as
Professor Kaye has argued, these difficulties might be eased by presenting
jurors with a range of plausible prior probabilities of guilt and information

about what the likelihood ratio for the DNA evidence implies given these
different priors.40 This approach allows jurors to estimate, without doing any
unfamiliar mathematical calculations, their own prior probabilities based on
the non DNA evidence in the case and to appreciate the implications of the

DNA evidence given these probabilities.
The switch to Bayesian methods should be especially salutary if the chance
of false positive error is taken seriously and to a lesser extent if the ceiling
principle is adopted. The danger of these reforms is that the moderate probabili?
ties they can yield will misleadingly appear more exonerative than incriminat?
ing. When the statistics of DNA matches are presented in traditional frequentist
fashion, this possibility appears substantial. The Bayesian approach indicates,
however, that apparently small likelihood ratios, like 20:1, are sufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even when other evidence in the case

leaves the factfinder in equipoise.41 With Bayesian methods neither the scientif?
ically necessary conservatism of acknowledging false positive risk nor the
scientifically questionable conservatism of the ceiling principle should lead to

many mistaken acquittals.
Thus, in the first best world, there would be no ceiling principle, but jurors
would be provided with relatively conservative estimates of the incriminatory
implications of DNA matches because the implications of false positive risk

and the relative-containing contours of most suspect populations would be
recognized. This is the world that scientists should be arguing for. But the
39. Evett and his coauthors advocate a procedure that avoids match binning entirely and is
generally superior to the match binning methodology. However, as developed, it too can be
insensitive to the relevance of special suspect populations and ignores the implications of error.
Until the method is extended to treat these issues, I do not advocate their Bayesian approach. But
match binning results as limited by the false positive rate can also be presented as likelihood ratios
of the probability of reported matches under the hypotheses of guilt and innocence. In practice,
it will ordinarily be the false positive rate that defines the likelihood ratio of a reported match and
the imprecision that this entails as well as that entailed by the use of match binning to generate

likelihood ratios can be safely ignored.

40. See, e.g., Kaye supra note 38.

41. Most surveys suggest that most people regard probabilities of guilt in excess of 90% as
sufficient to justify a conviction. See, e.g., R. Simon & L. Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof:

A View from the Bench, the Jury and the Classroom, 5 Law & Soc'y Rev. 319 (1971); Reid
Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror Decision Making, in Inside the Juror: The Psychology of
Juror Decision Making 85, 102-03 (R. Hastie ed., 1993) (reviewing studies).
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world of forensic science is side-oriented, even when good scientists are in?
volved. Since prosecutors and their DNA experts do not seem eager to abandon
often overwhelming random match probabilities despite good scientific rea?
sons, the ceiling principle may be the best that science can offer law. Fortu?
nately lawyers have learned to love misshapen stones in grotesque structures.
But the strain on scientists is understandable, for they have a different sense
of the aesthetic.
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